On February 14, 2025, a publication in X of the Argentine President, Javier Milei, lit a spark that unleashed a financial storm.
In his account, with more than 3 million followers, he disseminated a cryptocurrency called «Libra»presenting it as part of a private project to finance small ventures in Argentina.
Only in a matter of minutes, the value of the Token shot up, reaching a market capitalization of 4,000 million dollars, such as cryptonotics showed it at the time.
Thousands of investors (with enough knowledge about how to use a Solana Wallet and how to exchange tokens in a decentralized exchange of that network), joined the speculative frenzy and bought.
But euphoria lasted little: hours later, A few wallets – apparently insiders of the project – they sold pound massivelythe price collapsed and more than 40,000 people lost sums that, together, reach 300 million dollars, according to data published in Dune Analytics.
Hours later, Milei erased the tweet, claiming that he was not «internalized» in the project, but the damage was done. Today, dozens of affected demand the president and the companies behind the Token Libra, accusing them of orchestrating a scam.
It is «Criptogate«Argentino has generated a debate that transcends cryptocurrencies and puts an awkward question on the table: Who is responsible when a high -risk investment goes wrong?
Before continuing I must clarify that, in my opinion-on the basis of the on-chain data that can be seen in the Solana Red-,, The launch of Libra had several suspicious elements that bring him closer to what is known as ‘rug-pull‘. In addition, I am convinced that President Milei should never have promoted (or, as he says, disseminated) that digital asset. This text does not seek to make a defense of the Argentine president, but to reflect on the need to assume decisions by investors.
While the demands and investigations against Milei advance both in Argentina and the United States, I can’t help tracing A parallel with Another group that, in the last decade, has taken holders in Argentina: the self -styled «mortgaged grapes.»
To understand this connection, we must first go back to the context that gave rise to this group. In 2016, during the Government of Mauricio Macri, grape mortgage loans (purchasing value unit) were launched, a system that indexes the quotas of loans to the inflation index.
The proposal was seductive: in a country where access to their own housing is an elusive dream, UVA credits offered low initial quotas and long deadlines, ideal for the middle class.
Tens of thousands of Argentines receive (and continue to receive, because the program remains in force) grape mortgage loans.
But inflation shot up. Between 2018 and 2020, the fees multiplied, and many debtors saw their monthly payments exceed their income.
The «mortgaged grape» collective emerged, which claims to the State and banks solutions such as debt restructuring or the elimination of indexation, arguing that they were induced to an unsustainable system. In other words: They ask that the State unknown the rules of the game that they themselves accepted, just because now they are not favorable.
At first glance, the «mortgaged grapes» and the libra claimants seem dissimilar cases: one linked to traditional real estate loans, the other to the volatile world of cryptocurrencies. However, Both share a common nucleus: the perception of being victims of a system that deceived them, and the search for an external guilty to relieve the consequences of risky financial decisions.
On the one hand, the mortgaged grapes blame the government and banks, despite having accepted an inflation indexed loan, in a country that historically suffers from high inflation.
On the other hand, Libra’s plaintiffs point to Milei and the companies involved, such as Kip Protocol and Kelsier Ventures, for launching a token that obviously had all the characteristics of a speculative memecoin: high concentration of tokens in a few wallets, absence of real backup and a zero utility.
In both cases, those affected appear as deceived, but this narrative avoids an awkward truth: Both grape and pound credits were, from the beginning, high -risk bets.
The «mortgaged grapes» knew that inflation in Argentina is an unpredictable monster. Decades of economic crises, defaults And devaluations have made it clear that any financial instrument linked to inflation is a Russian roulette. UVA contracts, although promoted with official optimism, did not hide their indexation. Those who signed bet on a stability scenario that did not materialize, but that bet was a conscious choice.
In the same way, Token Libra investors entered a market known for their volatility. Shitcoins (unlike Bitcoin and, perhaps, a few serious projects) have no solid economic foundations; Its value depends on the speculation and support of public figures.
When Milei tweeted on Libra, many bought without investigating, seduced by the fever of the moment. And it is worth clarifying that these investors were not rookies in the matter, since certain intermediate level knowledge is required to be able to do the operation.
The Token, created just minutes before the announcement, was controlled by a handful of Wallets who withdrew with millionaire profits shortly before the collapse. The maneuver smells like a classic “pump and dump”, But holding only Milei or the creators ignore the individual responsibility of those who, attracted by the promise of rapid profits, ignored the alert signs.
This comparison does not intend to minimize the pain of those who lost savings or face unpayable quotas. The frustration of the «mortgaged grapes», trapped in debts that grow faster than their salaries, is as real as that of Libra investors, who saw their money evaporate in hours.
But empathy should not cloud objectivity. In both cases, Those affected made decisions based on optimistic expectations, underestimating risks that were evident. The «mortgaged grapes» trusted a historically unstable financial system; Libra claimants launched a market where more than 90% of memecoins end up in oblivion.
The victimization narrative has a cost. By exclusively blaming governments, banks or public figures, A mentality is perpetuated that dodges self -responsibility.
The «mortgaged grapes» demand that the State absorb the consequences of a risk that they assumed; Libra demanders seek judicial compensation for an investment that, as Milei himself said – from my view, very rightly – was «how to play in a casino.» And who has knowledge to use a Solana Wallet, connect it to a DEX and seek the address of the contract that Milei shared, it is practically impossible not to know.
This victimist posture discourages financial learning. The case of Libra, in particular, illustrates why assuming the risks involved in an investment is fundamental in the world of cryptocurrencies, especially with speculative shitcoins.
Such currencies, lacking practical utility, live and die from investor’s confidence. Buying them is to bet that someone else will pay more expensive later, a game where the last to enter usually lose everything.
Milei’s dissemination, although irresponsible, did not force anyone to invest. Each buyer had the option to investigate, to doubt, to refrain. In a market where scams are frequent and scarce regulation, responsibility falls to the individual.
All this shows that learning to read a whitepaperverifying the distribution of tokens and avoiding the desires of instant wealth is not a luxury, but a necessity. Who ignore these precautions More than victims of an unfair system, they are players who entered the casino without understanding the rules.
Discharge of responsibility: The views and opinions expressed in this article belong to its author and do not necessarily reflect those of cryptootics. The author’s opinion is informatively and under no circumstances constitutes an investment recommendation or financial advice.